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Abstract—The development of secure and privacy-preserving
software systems entails the continuous consideration of the
security and privacy aspects of the system under development.
While contemporary software development practices do sup-
port such a continuous approach towards software development,
existing threat modeling activities are commonly executed as
single-shot efforts leading to a single, historic, and quickly
obsolete view on the security and privacy of the system. This
disconnect leads to undetected new issues and wasted efforts on
already resolved problems, effectively accruing technical debt.
The presented SPARTA prototype facilitates the consideration
of security and privacy by providing support for: (i) capturing se-
curity and privacy design decisions in a DFD-based architectural
abstraction, (ii) continuous threat elicitation on this knowledge-
enriched abstraction, and (iii) risk analysis of the elicited threats
for prioritizing security and privacy efforts. By capturing and
continuously assessing the impact of security and privacy design
decisions on the elicited threats, the progress towards securing
the system can be assessed and alternatives can be compared,
taking into account past and present design decisions.
Index Terms—Security, Privacy, Threat modeling, Risk analy-
sis, Secure design
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and Privacy by Design (SbD/PbD) are increasingly
being recognized as essential principles for preventing the
introduction of design flaws that compromise security or
privacy [1]. Recently introduced laws, such as the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2], even mandate adhering
to privacy and data protection by design, and by default, for all
systems involved in the processing of personal data. A way to
realize these principles in practice is the application of a threat
modeling approach, such as STRIDE [3], [4] for security or
LINDDUN [5], [6] for privacy. These approaches start from
a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) [7] abstraction. They enable a
rigorous and methodical security and privacy analysis of the
system under design, by systematically iterating over the model
elements to identify all potential security or privacy threats.
Afterwards, the discovered threats must still be manually
assessed with respect to their importance (for example, based
on likelihood and impact). This assessment ideally involves:
(i) the consideration of existing countermeasures, (ii) other
stakeholders, and (iii) the application of risk assessment
methodologies [8], [9]. This to assist in the trade-off between
introducing additional countermeasures (including their effec-
tiveness) and their associated cost and impact.
However, even with the application of well-established risk
analysis methodologies, performing this analysis in a separate
activity requires considerable effort. Furthermore, it scatters
the relevant knowledge across multiple artifacts, hindering the
easy reuse of this knowledge when revisiting earlier decisions.
In this paper, we present the prototype of our SPARTA
tool, implementing the earlier presented approach [10], which
combines threat modeling and risk analysis in a single context.
SPARTA supports the enrichment of existing threat modeling
artifacts with the information necessary for performing a risk
analysis. SPARTA can incorporate both these activities in a
single analysis step. Similar to other tools [11], this step results
in a list of threats. A distinguishing feature of SPARTA is that
the resulting list of threats if further enriched with a risk
estimate, based on Monte Carlo simulations that take into
account the value of threatened assets, as well as the difficulty
of various types of attackers to overcome the security and
privacy countermeasures that are in place.
SPARTA provides several benefits to its users: (i) guidance
in prioritizing security and privacy efforts towards the most
important threats; (ii) including security and privacy counter-
measures in the model and taking their effect into account
during the threat elicitation and risk analysis; (iii) replacing an
all-or-nothing ‘mitigates’ relation between a countermeasure
and a threat with one that takes the countermeasure’s strength
and attacker’s capability into account; and (iv) enable monitor-
ing of the overall risk reduction progress with the introduction
of countermeasures and keeping track of the residual risk.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II positions our
work with respect to existing tools and approaches. Section III
elaborates on SPARTA’s design, implementation and usage.
Next, Section IV discusses both initial and future evaluations.
Section V lists some ideas for future extensions to SPARTA.
Finally, Section VI summarizes our main contributions.
II. RELATED WORK
Threat modeling was introduced by Microsoft as part of
its security development lifecycle [3], [4], [12]–[14] and has
proven popular since with multiple real-world applications in
industry [13]–[15]. Microsoft also provides tool support with
its Threat Modeling Tool [11] and more recently, the OWASP
project also provides the Threat Dragon tool [16], although it
currently does not yet automatically elicit threats.
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In existing approaches, DFDs remain largely security- and
privacy-agnostic, with minor, often ad-hoc, additions for secu-
rity or privacy. Recently, however, there are several proposals
for a more systematic representation of security and privacy
knowledge to elicit more relevant treats [17]–[19].
Complementary to threat modeling, risk analysis can be
used [20]. Approaches such as CORAS [8] elicit security
requirements starting from security goals or anti-goals. There
are also tools in this space, such as Irius Risk [21], which
focuses on the used technological components and associated
risk instead of starting from the design of the application.
Finally, tools such as ThreatSpec [22] start from code-level
enrichments to generate the DFDs for subsequent analysis.
An issue previously identified by Tu¨rpe [23] is the lack of
addressing the interplay between the design, threat, and goal
dimensions of security. This issue remains overlooked in the
currently available tool support.
III. SPARTA
This section elaborates on the SPARTA prototype.1 First,
a high-level overview of the design and implementation are
provided. Next, the practical usage of SPARTA is discussed.
A. Design & Implementation
At its core, SPARTA is based on typical DFD models that
are used for threat modeling, extending them with security and
privacy solutions and risk analysis information.
Plain DFD model: Basic threat modeling starts from a plain
DFD model, which defines an abstract view of the system under
design using four types of elements: process, data store, external
entity, and data flow. For threat modeling, a fifth element type
is added, namely trust boundaries. This model is subsequently
used to elicit threats by matching model elements to certain pre-
defined threat expressions. For example, information disclosure
threats on a data flow that ends in a data store can be found
by matching the expression ‘∗−flow−data store’. Each
threat type has such an expression to specify which combination
of DFD model elements is vulnerable to that type of threat. By
systematically matching the threat expressions to all elements,
the list of threats is generated. This corresponds to the basic
operation of the STRIDE [4] and LINDDUN [5] methodologies.
Enrichment with security and privacy solutions: The
approach outlined above is completely unaware of any ex-
isting security or privacy countermeasures. Tools such as the
Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool [11] take these into account
to a limited degree by attaching simple properties to individual
elements. The values of these properties can be used to exclude
inapplicable threats during generation. For example, each data
flow has a property Provides confidentiality which can be
set to ‘yes’ or ‘no’. When set to ‘yes’, information disclosure
threats are no longer generated for that flow. While useful, such
properties are very local, and their expressiveness is limited.
SPARTA supports a more extensive representation [19] of
security solutions in the form of architectural patterns for
1More information at: https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/sparta
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Fig. 1. Overview of the FAIR risk components and their combinations
The risk components from FAIR [9] are used to estimate the risk using Monte
Carlo simulations. The nodes show example estimate distributions (graphs)
and the lines illustrate which components are combined.
Legend: S: Strength, TC: ThreatCapability, CF: Contact Frequency, PoA:
Probability of Action, V: Vulnerability, TEF: Threat Event Frequency, LEF:
Loss Event Frequency, LM: Loss Magnitude, R: Risk
security [24] and privacy. The patterns can express complex
solutions that involve multiple DFD model elements (instead
of a single element with the property). They define various
roles that need to be bound to DFD elements, as well as a
Countermeasure element that specifies which threat(s) on which
element(s) are actually mitigated by the solution. By specifying
the countered threats in the solution, the set of solutions can
be extended without modifying the threat expressions.
Consider, for example, TLS for protecting against infor-
mation disclosure and tampering of a data flow, and against
spoofing of the server. Authentication in this context typically
happens only in one direction (i.e., the client authenticates
the server) and only for those flows that are part of the TLS
communication (i.e., other flows to the server are not protected).
A single property on the data flow or server process would be
insufficient to capture this security solution correctly [19].
Risk analysis enrichments: Risk analysis explicitly takes
into account uncertainty. SPARTA realizes this by implementing
FAIR risk analysis [9], inspired by Bedra [25] who applied
the Monte Carlo simulations for estimating the Vulnerability.
However, SPARTA widens this approach by performing Monte
Carlo simulations for each risk component from FAIR [9].
To enable this analysis, the underlying DFD model is ex-
tended with risk analysis information, in the form of estimates.
Using a risk analysis methodology enables the assessment a
threat’s applicability on a continuous scale (namely its risk)
instead of a binary scale (i.e., applicable or not applicable). This
type of relation is much more realistic, as no security/privacy
mechanism is perfect; in SPARTA, a partial reduction of a
threat’s applicability can still be taken into consideration.
Figure 1 shows the risk components from FAIR [9] that
SPARTA uses. For each type of threat, the leaves in this tree
(i.e., countermeasure strength, attacker capability, probability
of action, contact frequency, and loss magnitude) have to
be entered by security experts and other stakeholders. To
handle the uncertainty on this information, each element
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Fig. 2. WebRTC Data Flow Diagram used in the evaluation. Individual dataflow
labels are omitted for readability.
is represented as an Estimate with four parameters: {min,
probable, max, confidence}. One estimate defines a modified
PERT distribution [26]. The leaves in Figure 1 contain examples
of these distributions and shows how they are combined.
A risk estimation is performed for every threat that is
generated using the threat generation expressions. To determine
the risk for a threat, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed by
sampling from the respective distributions, and combining
the samples as shown in Figure 1. We highlight that the
computation of a vulnerability converges to a single number,
namely the probability that an attacker with the given capability
distribution defeats a countermeasure with the given strength
distribution. If multiple countermeasures are present (as part
of a defense in depth strategy), the vulnerability becomes the
probability of defeating all of them. Also note that the risk
analysis always happens in the context of a specific attacker
type, as a script kiddie has a different capability than a nation
state to overcome certain security and privacy countermeasures.
B. Usage
This section briefly discusses the usage of SPARTA. Analo-
gously to existing threat modeling activities, using SPARTA
starts with the creation of a data flow diagram, such as the
DFD in Figure 2, of the system under design. After creating
the diagram, individual DFD elements are enriched with value
estimates. These estimates specify the potential loss when a
threat occurs. A single value is sufficient for the analysis, but
SPARTA also supports specifying different estimates per threat
type, for example when the disclosure of information would
result in higher losses than unauthorized modifications.
In addition to the estimates, security and privacy solutions
can be added as well. SPARTA imports external solution
catalogs to enable reuse of existing security and privacy
solutions. A solution type in a catalog contains the details on
specific countermeasures (e.g., the TLS solution contains vari-
ous encryption, integrity, and authentication countermeasures)
and their strength, which are used in the risk analysis later on.
Using a central catalog prevents the need for re-entering this
information every time a solution is instantiated.
With that, all necessary information in the model is provided.
Next, SPARTA’s risk analysis is performed in the context of
a specific attacker model. This attacker model specifies the
ThreatCapability, ProbabilityOfAction, and ContactFrequency
risk components, as illustrated in Figure 1. In principle, the
threat modeler can specify any custom attacker type. To limit
the required inputs, SPARTA offers a built-in set of attacker
types, ranging from an opportunistic attacker to more advanced
attackers such as capable, motivated, and organized attackers.
After selecting the attacker model, SPARTA’s threat elicita-
tion and risk analysis can be run. SPARTA will continuously
perform pattern matching to find threats in the provided DFD
model. For this it uses the VIATRA2 query engine and graph-
based pattern language. For each threat it finds, a risk analysis
is conducted by sampling from the attacker, countermeasure
strength, and DFD element value distributions. Using these
samples, SPARTA combines them to calculate a risk estimate.
This risk estimate, as well as the intermediate results (e.g.,
vulnerability) are included in the resulting threat list.
IV. EVALUATION
We conducted an initial performance evaluation of SPARTA
by running a threat and risk analysis on the WebRTC [27]
reference architecture, shown in Figure 2, containing 42 DFD
elements and resulting in 194 threats. The total analysis time
(averaged over 10 runs) is 3.35 s, which includes loading the
model, the query engine, pattern matching (for eliciting threats),
risk analysis, and presenting the results to the user. Performing
100 runs for the just the threat elicitation and risk analysis
(with 2000 samples per distribution) results in a mean value
of 842ms (95% CI: 718ms–966ms).
Additionally, we qualitatively evaluated the DFD solution
enrichment of SPARTA, by comparing it with security property-
based solutions such as the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool
2016 [11], showing positive improvements in terms of semantic
quality, traceability, separation of concerns, and dynamism [19].
Finally, we conducted an evaluation of SPARTA’s risk-
based threat prioritization on the open source whistleblower
submission system SecureDrop [28], showing that the security
countermeasures implemented in SecureDrop more often
correspond to the high-risk threats identified by our tool than
the low-risk threats [29].
V. ONGOING WORK
We are currently extending SPARTA on three fronts. First,
adding a security or privacy solution to a DFD model can
be made more convenient by automatically instantiating any
new elements and binding existing DFD-model elements to
the security roles.
Second, the application of a specific security solution in an
existing model can be extended to provide decision making and
trade-off support to aid in the evaluation of multiple alternative
security or privacy solutions, by evaluating their impact (i) on
the DFD-model itself, (ii) on the resulting threat list, and (iii) on
the calculated risks.
2https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/modeling.viatra
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Fig. 3. Screenshot of SPARTA showing an example DFD model and the
associated list of threats, color-coded based on the threat’s calculated risk.
Finally, we also intend to centralize the security and privacy
solution and threat knowledge bases of SPARTA, including
the corresponding estimates of countermeasure strength, for
example by fetching them from a web-service. This allows
dynamic updates, keeping up-to-date with recent advancements
in the field.
In the future, we intend to perform a user study on the
approach realized in SPARTA, to assess the trade-off in effort
between enriching the model with estimates and manually
triaging the threats.
VI. CONCLUSION
Existing threat modeling tools lack an approach for priori-
tization that is grounded in data related to the security goals
of the system under consideration. Additionally, risk analysis
tools are disconnected from the concrete design of the system
and the threats that such a design encompasses.
Our SPARTA tool addresses this disconnect by combining
both DFD-based threat modeling, enriched with security and
privacy solutions, and risk analysis simulations based on
concrete element value estimates, countermeasure strengths,
and attacker types.
By conducting a security analysis in this manner, a prioritized
list of threats can be elicited, where the priority is based on
actual estimated risks grounded in the model data, attacker
type, and countermeasure data.
This type of tool support provides analysis results which
correspond more closely to reality, where nothing is perfectly
secure, but countermeasures do introduce a reduction of the
risk that a certain threat manifests itself. Additionally, the
risk-enriched threat list enables the threat modeler to monitor
progress in reducing and managing the overall risk.
Looking forward, the combination of threat modeling, risk
analysis, continuous monitoring to detect the appearance of
new threats, and integration with an external threat and security
solution catalog takes an important step forward towards
realizing continuous, threat analysis and risk assessment for
software systems.
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